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LIABILITY OF SURGEONS FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS
OF SERVANTS
The doctrine of respondeat superior, literally meaning "let the master
answer," is well established in the law of Pennsylvania.' The two classic tests
of whether the master is liable for the acts of the servant are whether he has the
actual or potential right of control 2 and whether the act was performed within
the servant's line of duty and scope of employment.' Physicians and surgeons,
like other persons, are subject to this doctrine.4
In the prior case of McConnell v. Williams the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court aligned the law of this state with the majority of states in this country that
have decided the question of whether a surgeon is liable for the negligent acts
of a borrowed servant performed during the course of an operation.' In this
case, Williams, the defendant-surgeon, was attempting to stop the hemorrhaging
of Mrs. McConnell following a Caesarean section. While the defendant's
attention was so absorbed, an intern, held by the court to be a borrowed servant,
negligently placed too large a quantity of silver nitrate in the new born baby's
eyes, and then failed to irrigate the eyes properly. This led to the total dis-
ability of one eye and the partial disability of the other. The court held the
defendant's right of control of the borrowed servant's negligent act to be a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. The decision was based on the rule that when different
inferences can fairly be drawn from the evidence as to whom is the controlling
master of the borrowed servant at the time the negligent act was committed, it
is for the jury to determine the question of agency." This case then leaves little
doubt that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to a highly skilled
surgeon employing an intern to assist him in the course of an operation; how-
ever, by dicta it denies liability for post-operative care, stating "as to all such
care and attention they [servants] would clearly be acting exclusively on behalf
of the hospital and not as assistants to the surgeon." '
It appears that the following facts in the recent case of Yorston v. Pennells
do not fall within the holding of the McConnell case which restricted liability
I Shaw v. Reed, 9 Watts and S. 72 (1845); Joseph v. U.A.W., 343 Pa. 636, 23 A.2d 470
(1942); Restatement (Second), Agency, § 219 (1958).
2 Joseph v. U.A.W., 343 Pa. 636, 23 A.2d 470 (1942), (Camp director hired a farmer to take
guests for a ride).
3 Orr v. Win. J. Burns Int. Detective Agency, 337 Pa. 587, 12 A.2d 25 (1940) (guard shot
striker).
4 McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
5 Id.
6 Dunmire v. Fitzgerald, 349 Pa. 511, 516, 37 A.2d 596, 599 (1944); Siidekum, Adm'r v.
Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 414, 45 A.2d 59, 62 (1946); Kissel v. Motor
Age Transport Lines, Inc. 357 Pa. 204, 209, 53 A.2d 593 (1947).
7 McConnell v. Williams, supra note 4 at 364.
8 Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).
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to the operating room. Plaintiff-Yorston was injured by a flying nail from a
ramset gun. Upon entering the hospital, he carried with him a note from his
family physician stating that he was allergic to penicillin. Dr. Hatemi, a resi-
dent surgeon, directed Rex, a fourth year medical student who was serving
as a junior intern, to take the case history of Yorston. The taking of medical
histories was not Rex's normal line of duty. The plaintiff showed the note to a
nurse and to Rex. Rex, however, failed to record the allergy on the medical
history. At approximately the same time, Dr. Hatemi obtained permission from
defendant-Dr. Pennell, a staff surgeon, to perform an operation to remove the
nail. Under the hospital rules, a resident surgeon had to obtain a staff surgeon's
permission to operate. Under these same rules, the plaintiff became Pennell's
patient from the moment permission was granted. Operative procedure and
the prescription of antibiotics as part of the post-operative care were discussed at
this consultation, but penicillin was not specifically mentioned. During the
coqrse of the operation, Rex remembered that he failed to note the allergy. To
remedy the situation, Rex went to the operating room, and told an unknown per-
son of the existence of plaintiff's allergy. This person at some unknown later
time made a notation of the allergy on the medical history form. This notation
having been made after Dr. Hatemi's reading of the form, a dosage of 600,000
units of penicillin was prescribed. Plaintiff protested each of the three shots
administered to him by nurses. During the course of the administration of
these shots, Yorston protested to Dr. Pennell about his allergy, but the doctor
just walked away.' After the third shot, Dr. Pennell stopped the administra-
tion of the antibiotic. In a short time after his release from the hospital, the
plaintiff suffered a violent reaction to the penicillin which necessitated his return
to the hospital. As a direct result of this reaction, the plaintiff suffered perma-
nent, disabling injuries. As the plaintiff was covered by workmens' compensa-
tion, Dr. Pennell sent a bill to the insurer, who later paid it, for one hundred
dollars for the operation and eighty dollars for visits. Dr. Pennell was not
paid by the hospital, which was a charitable institution. He maintained an
office at the hospital for which he paid rent, and he customarily charged fees
for services rendered to his private patients. He also signed all hospital forms
concerning the patient during his stay in the hospital. Upon these facts, the
supreme court refused to overrule the trial court's refusal to grant a motion
non obstante veredicto and held that it was a question of fact for the jury as to
whether the defendant had the requisite right of control to establish the negli-
gent intern as his servant within the scope of employment.
9 At this point the writer enters a caveat concerning the possibility of Pennell's personal
negligence. However, the trial court refused to submit this issue to the jury. The supreme court




That different inferences can fairly be drawn from the Yorston fact situation
is undoubtedly true; this is true in regard to almost any statement of facts.
Nevertheless, the rule in this state is that when different inferences as to a fact
situation may fairly be drawn as to who was the controlling master at the time
of the commission of the negligent act, it is for the jury to determine the ques-
tion of agency."0 The application of this rule to the present case leaves no doubt
that the trier of fact has determined that, at the time of the commission of the
negligent act, the controlling master of both Hatemi and Rex was the defend-
ant.1
In the Yorston appeal the court based its decision on conventional agency
doctrines. Both Hatemi, the resident surgeon, and Rex, the junior intern, were
borrowed servants subject only to Pennell's right of control and working only
for his benefit within the scope of employment; thus the two requisites of the
test of the master servant relationship were fulfilled." Dr. Hatemi became the
servant of the defendant when permission to operate was given and the operative
procedure was approved by Dr. Pennell; Rex became the defendant's servant
through a subservancy when he took the case history, as this was not his normal
line of duty." Having established the subservancy of Rex, the court held his
knowledge and negligence was imputable to Pennell because Hatemi had the
implied authority to use Rex.
In a vigorous dissent Mr. Justice Benjamin R. Jones argued that the plain-
tiff was not Dr. Pennell's patient; hence no duty arose upon which negligence
could be based. In addition the dissent argued that the doctrine of the McCon-
nell case should not be extended to include pre and post-operative acts.'" The
master should not be held liable for his subservant's negligent acts outside the
operating room. The dissent quotes the McConnell case and states that liability
should not include any act not performed "during the course of and as an inte-
gral part of the operation." 15 The dissent would deny liability because the
agency was solely for the benefit of the hospital 18 and the negligent act did not
occur during the course of the operation. 7 In conclusion, the dissent rationalizes
its attack on the majority rule thusly:
Under the majority view, however, this doctrine is now to be used for
converting the operating room into a combat information center where in-
10 Cases cited note 6 supra.
11 Yorston v. Pennell, supra note 8.
2McGrath v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 348 Pa. 619, 623; 36 Atl. 2d 303, 305 (1944).
13 The court did not cite authority for this conclusion. For the author's rationalization see
note 21.
14 See dissent in Yorston v. Pennell, supra note 8.
.5 Id. at 51.
16 Id. at 53.
17 Id. at 52.
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formation as to and liability for the previous negligent actions of hospital
employees-unrelated to the success or failure of the operation-may be
transmitted and transferred to the operating surgeon, and for insuring em-
ployees of a convenient receptacle where their negligent actions may be dis-
carded whether or not they have any relation to the successful performance of
the operation. 18 (Emphasis added.)
It undoubtedly cannot be denied that the rule promulgated by the dissent
has considerable merit because it is based upon sound public policy. As is
pointed out in the conclusion of the brief for the defendant-appellant in the
Yorston case, 9 the rule, as adopted by the majority, will tend to increase the
burden of the staff surgeon in overseeing the care of patients in cases where he
is not performing the operation. This burden will be increased both as to his
time and as to his finances. Also the rule will tend to make surgeons wary of
tutoring resident surgeons and interns due to the increased risk of liability for
their negligent acts. This tutoring, performed without compensation in most
instances, is definitely socially desirable in that practical medical experiences
and knowledge is in this way transferred from one generation to the next.
In spite of the dissent's strong protest" based on law and public policy
and the view of the majority of courts in this country at present,2 the majority
view in the Yorston case would seem to be a justifiable extension of liability
in this area. First, Dr. Pennell had the requisite right of control of Dr. Hatemi
during the course of the operation; this is evidenced by the necessity of Hatemi's
obtaining his permission in order to operate. In this manner, Dr. Pennell be-
came liable for Hatemi's negligent acts, and had constructive notice of facts
Hatemi knew or should have known. This argument is strengthened by the
fact that Dr. Pennell had the choice of operating himself, or of allowing
Hatemi to operate; in this way, he chose Dr. Hatemi. Second, a servant is
authorized to appoint another servant if the original servant is in a position where
custom normally permits such appointment or the master's business reason-
ably requires such an appointment.2 2 The defendant could reasonably expect
Hatemi to appoint a servant such as Rex to carry on duties not primarily involved
with surgery. Even a layman could capably perform the task of inquring as to
an allergy and recording its existence on a chart. Also delegations of this type
would appear to be customary and necessary in the complex, daily procedure of
hospital administration.
1lid. at 56.
19 See the conclusion of the brief for appellant in Yorston v. Pennell, supra note 8.
20 Yorston v. Pennell, supra note 8, at 56.
21 MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 438 (4th ed. 1952).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 283 (1958); Moldawers Appeal, 121 Pa. Super. 163,
169, 183 At. 349, 351 (1936).
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Furthermore, Rex was Hatemi's servant within the scope of employment
at the time Rex's negligent act was committed. This would mean that the
knowledge of Rex concerning the allergy was imputable to Hatemi and thus
to the defendant. 23 With this constructive knowledge, Hatemi was negligent
in prescribing the penicillin. Hatemi, at the time of the commission of the
negligent act, was the servant of the defendant, and thus his negligence was
imputable to Pennell. Hence, it would seem that Pennell could be held liable
for either Rex's failure to record or Hatemi's prescription with constructive
knowledge. The dissent seems to misapply the agency rules by making the test
actual, direct control in the operating room itself.24 This is not the true test
of agency; the true test is whether the master had the actual potential right of
control at the time the negligent act was committed. Thus it can be seen that
the potential right of control is all that need be found. It would seem highly
frivolous to say that a surgeon does not have a potential right of control over
an intern preparing one of his patients for an operation. The point at which
preparation for the operation ceases and the actual operation begins would seem
to defy even the most well-reasoned rule. As far as the protection of the
patient from preventable injuries at the hands of servants is concerned, any such
attempt to draw a line would tend to be arbitrary and would fail to go to the
merits of the case.
In addition it should be pointed out that there is also very sound public
policy behind applying the rules of law to find liability in cases of pre-operative
and post-operative negligence by borrowed servants. Adopting the rule of this
case provides a means of redress for preventing injuries arising out of pre-
operative surgical care." Admittedly, the court in the McConnell case limited
the application of respondeat superior to the operating room exclusively," but
the same sound reasons exist beyond it. It should be noted that under the
rules of the hospital, Yorston became Dr. Pennell's patient when Pennell gave
Hatemi permission to operate. As Yorston was a patient to whom services
had been rendered, Dr. Pennell was entitled to a fee. If a surgeon is willing
to benefit from the aid of servants and subservants by receiving payment for
their work, he should also be made to give compensation for their incompetence
before, during, and after the operation. Limits will unquestionably have to be
drawn by the courts to circumscribe the surgeon's liability because even his poten-
tial right of control ceases sometime before and sometime after the operation.
However, this liability should not be arbitrarily limited to the physical boundaries
23RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §283 (1958); Isaac v. Donegal & Conoy Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 308 Pa. 444, 162 At. 300 (1932).
24 Yorston v. Pennell, supra note 15.
2.5 Joseph v. U.A.W., supra note 2.
26 34 MINN. L. REv. 266 (1950).
27 McConnell v. Williams, supra note 4.
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of the operating room, but it should be decided on the merits of the facts of each
case. It cannot be denied that such a rule will serve as a stimulant to greater
care in operations and in their surrounding circumstances. The protection of
patients in this highly vital and dangerous area of operative procedures should,
in this writer's opinion, be of prime importance to the courts. Finally as had
been pointed out by one of the eminent authorities on agency law, the doctrine
of respondeat superior has, as one of its important purposes, the spreading
of the cost of liability over the community. 8 It is also true today that the doctor
not covered by malpractice insurance is very rare. As a practical matter, so-
ciety can much more easily bear the costs of such liability through insurance than
can the party suffering the trauma.
The Yorston case represents a justifiable extension of liability of the
surgeon to acts of servants not committed in his immediate presence. As long
as the courts and legislature continue to sustain the doctrine of charitable im-
munity in spite of the common use of insurance by charitable organizations, the
rule in the present case will remain necessary to protect subjects of surgery in
this highly dangerous and crucial area of human endeavor. This extension is
based on sound public policy considerations and need not abuse agency rules
of long-standing. Whether this same extension will be granted by the courts
in the area of post-operative care was answered in the negative by dicta in
McConnell v. Williams. Bearing in mind that spotting a trend is always a
hazardous business, it is submitted that the Yorston case impliedly overrules this
dicta.
WILLIAM H. NEFF, JR.
28 See SEAVEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 450,
451 (1934).
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